





Volume 29, Issue 3 
  
What if the euro had never been launched? A counterfactual analysis of the 




Emmanuel Dubois  
PESOR, University of Paris XI 
Jerome Hericourt  
EQUIPPE, University of Lille and CES, University of 
Paris 1 
Valerie Mignon  
EconomiX-CNRS, University of Paris Ouest and CEPII
Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to gauge quantitatively the macroeconomic impact of EMU membership. Building on the 
Global VAR framework designed by Pesaran et al. (2004), we want to shed light on the following important questions: 
What if the euro had never been launched? How would national outputs and inflation rates have evolved? We show 
that monetary unification promoted lower interest rates and higher output in most euro area (EA) countries, relatively 
to a situation where national monetary policies would have followed a German-type one. If national monetary policies 
had adopted British monetary preferences after September 1992 however, this would have led to higher interest rates, 
depreciations of national exchange rates and higher output in most EA countries, especially over the 1992-1998 period. 
This is particularly true for the three biggest countries of the EA (France, Germany and Italy). Besides, the single 
currency regime probably did not have a massive impact on price developments.
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     1 Introduction
From the very beginning of the nineties, the European Monetary Union (EMU) has been a
hotly debated idea. Many academics from diﬀerent ﬁelds of international macroeconomics
used to predict serious troubles for the central bank which would have to set a common
monetary policy for such heterogenous countries. Using the Optimal Currency Area theo-
ries (Mundell, 1961; Mc Kinnon, 1963), Eichengreen (1991) argued that the euro area (EA)
had neither the labor ﬂexibility and mobility, nor the ﬁscal integration which are necessary
to replace exchange rate adjustments. Moreover, authors like Cukierman and Lippi (2001)
stressed that, confronted to the long term trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and employment in
case of cyclical shocks, the very inﬂation-averse European Central Bank (ECB) would be
unable to lead any stabilization policy. In other words, the strengthened credibility of the
new central banker and the gains related to the reduction of transaction costs would not
weigh enough when countries would be confronted to the inability of dampening asymmet-
ric shocks using the exchange rate.
Now that monetary integration is eﬀective, this article aims at providing a quantitative as-
sessment of the adequacy (or the inadequacy) of the single monetary policy to each member
country using a counterfactual approach. While the latter has recently received a growing
interest for monetary policy analysis (see e.g. Carlstrom and Fuerst, 2006, or Cavoli and
Rajan, 2006), there are only a few studies using it in the context of a global macroeconomic
setting in order to compare alternative monetary policy regimes. The two closest experi-
ments to our own research can be found in Pesaran et al. (2007) and Dees et al. (2007).
Both studies use a global macroeconometric framework (Global Vectorial AutoRegressive,
hereafter GVAR), developed by Pesaran et al. (2004), to investigate the interdependencies
between countries, especially those belonging to the euro area. Pesaran et al. (2007) is
of particular interest to us because it addresses a similar question regarding the United
Kingdom - What if the UK had joined the euro in 1999? Also close to our research is the
paper by Dees et al. (2007), since it extends the original GVAR model by augmenting
the number of countries and variables, providing a more fully description of the interac-
tions in the world economy and of the transmission mechanisms of shocks at a global level.1
Following the work of Dees et al. (2007) and Pesaran et al. (2007), our contribution is
twofold. First, to our knowledge, a quantitative approach to gauge the macroeconomic
impact of EMU membership has never been attempted. Second, we rely on the GVAR
framework and modify it to test two diﬀerent scenarios related to the absence of the euro
after January 1999.
This paper sheds light on the following important questions: What if the euro had never
been launched? How would national outputs and inﬂation rates have evolved? Based on
1Another noticeable contribution of Dees et al. (2007) is that they develop a theoretical
framework where the GVAR is interpreted as a global unobserved common factor model.
1the comparisons between the “true” GVAR and counterfactual GVARs, our main ﬁndings
show that monetary uniﬁcation promoted lower interest rates and higher output in most
EA countries, relatively to a situation where national monetary policies would have fol-
lowed a German-type one. If national monetary policies had adopted British monetary
preferences after September 1992 however, this would have led to higher interest rates, a
depreciation of national exchange rates and higher output in most EA countries, especially
over the 1992-1998 period. This is particularly true for the three biggest countries of the
EA (France, Germany and Italy).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the macroeconometric framework.
Section 3 addresses methodological concerns and details the diﬀerent counterfactual scenar-
ios. In Section 4, results of the diﬀerent scenarios are presented and commented. Section 5
provides concluding remarks.
2 The Global VAR framework
We consider a sample of N countries, i = 1,...,N. In our empirical analysis, N = 30,2 data
are monthly and cover the period from April 1980 to May 2006. The aim of the GVAR
framework is to construct a model in which all the variables are endogenous. To this end,
we can proceed in three steps (see Pesaran et al., 2004, and Pesaran et al., 2007).
In a ﬁrst step, we estimate N individual VAR processes:
Xit = Φi0 + Φi1Xit−1 + ... + ΦipXit−p + Ψi0X∗
it + Ψi1X∗
it−1 + ... + ΨipX∗
it−p + εit (1)
with i = 1,...,N is the country and t = 1,...,T is time. The VAR process contains two
types of variables: country-speciﬁc (vector Xit) and foreign (vector X∗
it) variables. Both
vectors contain seven variables: real industrial production, consumer price index, short-
term nominal interest rate, real money stock, real equity prices, nominal exchange rate
against the US dollar, and oil prices. All variables, but the interest rate, are expressed in
logarithms. For all countries, but the US, oil prices are included as an exogenous variable.
By contrast, exchange rates are treated as endogenous for all countries, except for the US.






2The list of considered countries and the description of the data are given in the appendix.
As in many previous studies (Pesaran et al., 2004 and Dees et al., 2007), notably absent are the
newly constituted economies of the Eastern Europe. These countries have been excluded due to
obvious data availability on the considered period. Whereas our time span starts in 1980, time
series are most of the time not available for Central and European Countries before the ﬁrst half
of the nineties.
2where wij denotes the share of country j in the trade of country i, i 6= j. Note that wii = 0
and that the sum of the weights is equal to 1, that is
P
j wij = 1. The weights rely on the
geographic distribution of imports and exports of goods and services in 2004 and are taken
from the CEPII-BACI database. We thus consider constant weights, an assumption which
deserves some comments, especially in the case of our counterfactual analysis. Since the
commonly expected beneﬁt of adopting a single currency is increased trade, various stud-
ies have investigated the question of how the euro was boosting trade since the pioneering
study by Rose (2000).3 The current consensus is that the positive impact of the euro on
trade is lower than that was initially expected with an estimated eﬀect on trade growth
that is below 5% (see Fontagn´ e et al., 2009). More precisely, Baldwin et al. (2008) report
that after the introduction of the euro, aggregate trade ﬂows between euro-area countries
increased by only 2%. On the whole, while the trade-creating eﬀect of the euro within area
countries is positive, it is suﬃciently limited in size to justify the use of constant weights.
An additional argument can be found in Pesaran et al. (2004) who argue that time-varying
weights could introduce an undesirable degree of randomness into the analysis and mask
the cyclical movements of the regional output being measured. Finally, it should be noted
that Dees et al. (2007) addressed this issue by using time-varying weights and ﬁnd that
the results were quite similar to those based on constant weights.
Turning to the other characteristics of the individual VAR processes, note that the US
model presents speciﬁcities reﬂecting the impact of the US economy on some worldwide
variables like oil prices. In other words, some restrictions are imposed concerning the US
variables: only foreign industrial production and CPI are considered as exogenous in the
US model.
In a second step, the country-speciﬁc and foreign variables are stacked to study the dy-





0 and deﬁning Xt as the vector which put together all the endogenous
variables of the system, that is Xt =
 
X1t X2t ... XNt
0, we can write:
Zit = WiXt (3)
where Wi denotes the trade matrix for country i.
In the third step, we derive the expression of the GVAR in which all the variables are
endogenous:
Xt = G0 + G1Xt−1 + ... + GpXt−p + ut (4)
3See Baldwin et al. (2008), Fontagn´ e et al. (2009), Ottaviano et al. (2009), and the references
therein.
3with G0 and Gj, j = 1,...,p, are matrix of coeﬃcients that notably depend on the trade
matrix and ut is the error term matrix.
3 Counterfactual scenarios: Methodological options
Our purpose is to simulate two scenarios of non-participation to the euro. Formally, this
will be done by (i) estimating the GVAR on a subperiod preceding the European Exchange
Rate Mechanism (ERM) crisis and (ii) imposing restrictions to the interest and exchange
rate equations of the GVAR. Afterwards, the diﬀerence between the forecast produced by
the unrestricted GVAR and this restricted forecast will be analyzed. Following Pesaran
et al. (2007), we do not compare the outcomes produced by the alternative scenario to
the actual data. If we consider the latter as restricted forecasts, it may be diﬃcult to
perform clear comparisons, since it will not be possible to distinguish between the eﬀects
of forecasts errors and the eﬀects of the restrictions imposed. Here, we avoid the problem
by studying the diﬀerence between the unrestricted and restricted forecasts.4
Turning to the scenarios themselves, they aim at providing answers to two questions: can
we outline diﬀerences between the single currency world and various counterfactual ones
where countries keep their own currencies? And more generally, would European countries
have beneﬁtted from less conservative monetary policies in the nineties, as argued by many
academics (see in particular De Grauwe, 1995)? Of course, we cannot know exactly what
would have happened if the project of a single currency had been cancelled. But we can
deﬁnitely imagine a few credible paths. We consider therefore two diﬀerent counterfactu-
als, which are polar cases with the same basis. They both postulate that the European
Exchange Rate Mechanism does not survive the September 1992 crisis, and that all euro
area members come back to ﬂoating exchange rates. Therefore, we reestimate the GVAR
over the 1980:04-1992:09 period and proceed as follows. In the ﬁrst scenario, all EA mem-
bers decide to adopt German monetary preferences. This is modelled by imposing German
coeﬃcients for interest and exchange rates behaviors, that is, by constraining coeﬃcients
4Of course, the use of a pure autoregressive speciﬁcation can be challenged by the Lucas cri-
tique. Structural Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models incorporate rational
expectations allowing them to be theoretically robust the critique. Without questioning its the-
oretical logic, a number of studies showed however that the Lucas critique had empirical limited
implications (see in particular Estrella and Fuhrer, 1999, or Levieuge and Penot, 2008). Others
emphasized that forward-looking models often suﬀer from serious drawbacks regarding macroe-
conomic shocks identiﬁcation, since they fail to consider the inertial behaviors of agents and
then sluggishness of data (see Fuhrer, 1997; Estrella and Fuhrer, 2002). In our context, a VAR
approach may seem more appropriate since it imposes only minimal structural requirements,
allowing to “let the data speak”. Besides, Pesaran et al. (2007) emphasize that DSGE have
VARs with restrictions on the coeﬃcients as reduced forms. But the building of such a “global
DSGE”, with a GVAR as reduced form, is clearly beyond the scope of our paper. This also raises
crucial identiﬁcation issues. Indeed, simulation exercises usually draw on hypotheses regarding
the equations of the structural model, supporting in turn the restrictions on the reduced-form
equation.
4of all EA members interest and exchange-rate equations to be equal to the German ones.
This scenario has two major interests. First, Germany was the only country to have an
autonomous monetary policy since it was the EMS leading country. Second, over all the
considered period, it seems that the German monetary policymaker followed a forward-
looking variant of the Taylor (1993) rule (1.3 on inﬂation gap, 0.25 on output gap, see
Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1998).
In the second scenario, EA countries decide to adopt British monetary preferences, the
UK being a genuine ﬂoater. We proceed the same way we did for the German case,
by constraining coeﬃcients of all EA members interest and exchange-rate equations to be
equal to the British ones. This scenario may appear as a textbook experiment. However, it
constitutes a relevant benchmark since many observers and academics considered that UK
monetary policy was much more suitable regarding both output growth and stabilization
than the European / German-lead ones (see, among others, Coquet and Le Bihan, 1997).
4 Results
Figures A1 and A2 in Appendix present the results of the empirical study for each EA
member. Figures A1 report, over each relevant subperiod, the mean (interest rates) and
the variation (output, prices and exchange rates) coming from the real data and the ones
produced by the original GVAR. By solving the original GVAR, we have an overview of
its ability for reproducing the real data. The comparison of the data for each country
emphasizes that the GVAR reproduces fairly well the original data. Figures A2 report,
for each simulation exercise, the gap between the forecasts produced by the unrestricted
GVAR and the ones deduced from the counterfactual GVAR.5 A negative (resp. positive)
gap means that the considered variable is lower (resp. higher) in the genuine GVAR. For
the exchange rates, a negative sign implies that the exchange rate depreciates relatively to
the unrestricted (genuine) GVAR. Conversely, a positive sign means that the exchange rate
appreciates relatively to the path predicted by the genuine GVAR. Finally, we distinguish
subperiods before and after 1999 (corresponding to the launch of scriptural euro), in order
to check the possibility of new trends or dynamics induced by the single currency regime.
4.1 Scenario 1: German scenario
The results of this ﬁrst counterfactual are remarkably consistent. Regarding interest rates,
the gaps are almost systematically negative, indicating that interest rates would have
tended to be higher under German monetary preferences. Interestingly, this is especially
true for the 1999-2005 subperiod, where gaps are signiﬁcant for all countries but France and
Greece. The levels of these gaps (ranking from -2.51 to -11.37%) are also quite substantial:
under this counterfactual regime, many EA members would have seen their interest rates
5Detailed tables of the results, including t-statistics to judge the signiﬁcance of the gaps, may
be downloaded at: http://economix.u-paris10.fr/fr/membres/?id=302.
5stuck to their mid-1990s values. Logically, our simulations show that national exchange
rates vs. the dollar would have appreciated signiﬁcantly more under the German scenario,
before and after 1999. It is also worth noting that this over-appreciation (relatively to the
genuine GVAR, under the single currency regime) tends to accelerate after 1999.
Turning to output, the diﬀerent proﬁles are once again very homogenous. Consistently
with previous results, output tends to be higher under the single currency regime (that is,
lower under Scenario 1) for many countries, but not for all over both subperiods. Interest-
ing exceptions are Belgium (but with weak signiﬁcance), France, Germany and Portugal.
For these four countries, output is signiﬁcantly lower in the genuine GVAR than under the
German scenario before 1999. One might see here the consequences of restrictive policy-
mix set up to fulﬁll the convergence criteria of the Maastricht Treaty. Conversely, output
is signiﬁcantly higher after 1999 under the single currency regime for Belgium, Finland,
Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain, with gaps ranking from
5.67% to 41.59%. For all other countries but Greece (the only one to exhibit a signiﬁcant
negative gap), gaps are not signiﬁcant. Once again, a plausible explanation of these higher
outputs may be the much more expansionary monetary conditions in the unrestricted
GVAR (i.e. under the single currency regime).
Concerning price evolutions, the separation around 1999 enlightens interesting diﬀerences.
Before 1999, countries clearly divide into two groups, one with higher prices in the gen-
uine GVAR (Belgium, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands) and one with lower prices
(Finland, France). The situation with higher prices is the most intuitive since monetary
policy is relatively more expansionary in the unrestricted GVAR than in the counterfac-
tual. For the remaining countries (Austria, Germany, Ireland, Portugal and Spain), the
diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant. After 1999, the distribution is quite diﬀerent: half of the EA
members display lower prices (Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg) while
Austrian, German, Irish and Dutch gaps are insigniﬁcant. What is remarkable, however,
is that the magnitude of these gaps is very small, even when they are signiﬁcant: they
rank from -0.38% to -3.06%, over a seven years period. With the exception of Portugal
and Spain which exhibit signiﬁcantly higher prices under the single currency regime, this
means that price dynamics are not fundamentally diﬀerent between Scenario 1 and mon-
etary uniﬁcation as embodied by the unrestricted GVAR. This should not be a surprise,
since Scenario 1 is based on German monetary preferences, the latter being quite close to
the ones of the European Central Bank in terms of price stability.
To sum it up, the German counterfactual features mainly higher interest rates and appre-
ciating exchange rates, relatively to the GVAR with single currency. Output tends to be
consistently higher under the single currency regime for most countries, while prices do
not display very high diﬀerences between the two regimes.
64.2 Scenario 2: British scenario
Once again, the results of this second counterfactual are quite consistent. Regarding inter-
est rates, gaps tend to be negative before 1999 for a huge number of countries, indicating
that interest rates would be once again lower under the single currency regime than under
a “British style” monetary policy. Before 1999, interest rates are higher with British mon-
etary preferences for Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, Nether-
lands, and Portugal. Gaps are insigniﬁcant for Finland, Ireland, Italy and Spain, while no
country displays higher interest rates in the unrestricted GVAR. After 1999, the picture
changes, since gaps are insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero for the three biggest EA countries
(France, Germany and Italy) and the three countries of the former Deutsche Mark zone
(Austria, Belgium, and Netherlands). Gaps are positive for four small countries (Finland,
Ireland and Luxembourg), and negative for Greece and Portugal. Overall, these results
strongly support the idea that national monetary policies with British preferences would
have been more restrictive until 1999, possibly reﬂecting an increase of risk premia on cur-
rencies often prone to exchange rate crisis and sharp devaluations. After 1999, however, a
British style monetary policy would not have been diﬀerent from ECB’s one, at least for
the six countries forming the historical and economic core of EA and accounting for more
than 90% of its GDP.
Exchange rates display evolutions consistent with interest rates behavior. Indeed, gaps
are signiﬁcantly negative in almost all cases, whatever the considered subperiod, indicat-
ing that national exchange rates would have depreciated quite strongly against the dollar
under Scenario 2, instead of the appreciation observed in the “real GVAR”. Only Greece
displays a stronger appreciation in the British counterfactual relatively to the unrestricted
GVAR, over the 1992-1998 subperiod. For all other countries, the behavior of the exchange
rate can easily be explained by the lack of credibility of national monetary policies in a
context of monetary uncertainty, characterized by quite substantial risk premia on interest
rates (cf. supra). In other terms, the monetary instability of the beginning of the nineties
would have lasted under Scenario 2, bringing strong depreciation dynamics. On the the-
oretical ground, this would fairly well ﬁt the uncovered interest rate parity theory, which
associates higher interest rates with expectations of depreciation for the exchange rate.
Turning to output, the distinction between the two subperiods reveals interesting diﬀer-
ences. Before 1999, output is lower under the single currency regime than in the British
counterfactual for Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Portugal, and Spain. Only Finland displays a higher output in the unrestricted GVAR,
while the remaining two (Austria, Greece) do not exhibit any signiﬁcant diﬀerence. In
other words, a huge majority of countries would have substantially beneﬁted, in terms of
output, from depreciated exchange rates, at least before 1999. This is especially true for
the three biggest EA members, with gaps reaching -7.84% (France), -11.52% (Germany),
and -7.11% (Italy). After 1999, the picture changes signiﬁcantly. Indeed, three groups of
countries emerge, not very diﬀerent in size. The ﬁrst group, made of Austria, France, Ire-
7land and Luxembourg, displays a lower output under the single currency regime, with gaps
ranking from -5.20% to -35.80%. In these countries, a weaker currency may still explain
this higher output in the British counterfactual. Conversely, the unrestricted GVAR pre-
dicts a higher output relatively to the British counterfactual for Belgium (15.27%), Finland
(3.15%) and Greece (1.93%). For the two latter, it is worth noting that these gaps are quite
small for a seven years period. For Belgium, this may mean that the country beneﬁted
more from monetary integration than what an autonomous monetary policy could have
brought. Eventually, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain do not display any
signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the two monetary regimes.
Concerning price evolutions, one can again observe diﬀerences between subperiods. Before
1999, prices are higher in the “true” GVAR for all countries but Spain, where no signiﬁcant
diﬀerence emerge. After 1999, prices are higher under the single currency regime in Austria,
Finland, France, Italy, Portugal and Spain; they are lower in Belgium and Germany, while
Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg and Netherlands do not display any signiﬁcant gap. Like in
the German counterfactual however, it is striking to see that the magnitude of these gaps is
very small, even when they are signiﬁcant: except Greece (over the 1992-1998 period), the
diﬀerence rarely exceeds 3.2% over seven years. This relative stability of price dynamics
across the diﬀerent monetary regimes is another interesting outcome of our simulations.
To sum it up, the British counterfactual features mainly higher interest rates and
depreciating exchange rates, relatively to the GVAR with single currency. Output tends
to be consistently lower under the single currency regime (higher under British monetary
preferences) for many countries, especially over the 1992-1998 period, mimicking therefore
the evolutions of British key macro variables during the nineties. Finally, prices do not
display very high diﬀerences between the two regimes.
5 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper consisted in providing quantitative estimations of the macroe-
conomic impact of monetary integration for the euro area countries. To do so, we used a
GVAR model in order to test two scenarios related to the absence of single currency. These
scenarios examined polar cases, where national EA monetary policies would have adopted
German preferences on the one hand, and British preferences on the other hand.
Our analyze emphasizes several major outcomes. It seems that monetary uniﬁcation pro-
moted lower interest rates and higher output in most EA countries, relatively to a situation
where national monetary policies would have followed a German-type one. If national mon-
etary policies had adopted British monetary preferences after September 1992 however,
this would have led to higher interest rates, huge depreciations of national exchange rates
against the dollar and higher output in most EA countries, especially over the 1992-1998
period. This is particularly true for the three biggest countries of the EA (France, Ger-
many and Italy). Interestingly, our simulations emphasize that the single currency regime
8probably did not have a massive impact on price developments, comparatively to credible
alternative monetary policy regimes.
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10Appendix
We consider a sample of 30 countries. They are listed in the following table.
Argentina Germany (Ger) Norway
Australia Greece (Gre) New Zealand
Austria (Aut) India Portugal (Prt)
Belgium (Bel) Ireland (Irl) South Africa
Brazil Italy (Ita) Spain (Spa)
Canada Japan Sweden
China Korea Switzerland
Denmark Luxembourg (Lux) Turkey
Finland (Fin) Mexico United Kingdom
France (Fra) Netherlands (Net) United States
Data are taken from various sources:
• Bilateral exchange rates against the USD are taken from IFS (International Finan-
cial Statistics, IMF), with the exception of the Greek series which is extract from
Datastream. Note that exchange rate series are expressed in nominal terms and are
considered in logarithms.
• Consumer price indexes (CPI) are generally taken from IFS, except for Australia and
New Zealand (Datastream). China is also an exception since CPI data are issued
from WDI (World Development Indicators, World Bank). All CPI series are based
in 2000.01 such that 2000.01 = 100. They are expressed in logarithms.
• Industrial production series generally come from IFS. Note that, for 7 countries
— Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, Greece, New Zealand and Switzerland —
the series are taken from Datastream. Industrial production series are expressed in
real terms, i.e. they have been deﬂated by the corresponding CPIs. All industrial
production series are based in 2000.01 (i.e. 2000.01 = 100) and are transformed into
logarithms.
• Concerning money, we generally consider the M1 aggregate, with the exception of
Brazil, Germany and Sweden for which we use the M3 aggregate. Money series are
taken from Datastream for China, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Mexico, the
Netherlands and Greece. For some series, two sources are used: Austria (Datastream
and Osterreichische National Bank), Belgium (Datastream and Eurostat), Denmark
(Datastream and IFS), Germany (IFS and Deutsche National Bank), Norway (Datas-
tream and IFS), Portugal (Eurostat and Banco de Portugal), and Spain (Datastream
and Eurostat). For the other countries, series are extracted from IFS. Money series
are expressed in logarithmic real terms (deﬂated by corresponding CPIs) and con-
verted in USD.
11• Interest rate series are generally taken from IFS. For three countries, Denmark, Lux-
embourg and Portugal, data are issued from Eurostat. For India and New Zealand,
the data are given by the Reserve Bank, and by the Central Bank for Norway. The
considered series are short term nominal interest rates (call money rate, one month
or three month rates, depending upon the considered country and data availability).
• Concerning share prices, series are mainly taken from IFS. We use data from Datas-
tream for Denmark, France, Sweden. For Austria, Luxembourg, Norway and Por-
tugal, data are taken from IFS and Eurostat. Finally, for UK, we use Eurostat
database. All series are expressed in real terms (i.e. deﬂated by corresponding CPIs)
and in logarithmic terms. They are based in 2000.01 such that 2000.01 = 100.
Finally, due to data availability or to the presence of outliers, some series are not considered
in our sample. This is the case for interest rate series for Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and
Turkey; money series for Finland, Greece, Ireland and Luxembourg; share price series for
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Figures A2. Differences between the forecasts produced by the unrestricted (original) GVAR 
and the counterfactual GVAR (left: German scenario, right: UK scenario). 